Home Echo 20 June 2025 ECHO Watch

20 June 2025 ECHO Watch

ECHO Watch Daily Brief: June 20, 2025

Executive Summary:

In the past 24 hours, the Iran-Israel conflict escalated with increased Iranian ballistic missile strikes on Beersheba (reportedly not defended) as well as claims regarding an Israeli military intelligence facility in Tel Aviv, and the first reported use of cluster munitions. Russia continues extensive bombardments of Ukraine, cementing strained relations between Kyiv and Moscow, while faced with increased drone strikes from Ukraine. China stepped up military operations around Taiwan (50 aircraft and naval vessels were detected) on top of threats of force, prompting Taiwan’s President to order heightened readiness. North Korea fired 10 artillery shells in response to trilateral drills by the US, ROK and Japan. North Korea condemned Israeli actions while seeking to deepen ties with Russia.

Scope & Objectives:

This daily brief provides an OSINT-driven update on key threat regions including Iran, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, China, Taiwan, and North Korea, focusing on attacks, significant geopolitical shifts, and military activities within the last 24-48 hours.

Methodology:

Information is compiled from open-source intelligence leveraging structured analytic techniques (SATs), principles from cognitive science in intelligence analysis, and superforecasting methodologies to provide a clear, concise, and actionable overview.

Disclaimer: This report is based entirely on publicly available sources. It reflects the author’s analytical judgment and does not represent official views of any government or institution. All assessments are subject to revision as new information emerges.


Findings:

  • Iran - Israel:
    • Intensified Attacks: Iran launched another ballistic missile that impacted Beersheba, Southern Israel, causing significant structural damage to apartment blocks, setting vehicles ablaze, and injuring at least five people from smoke inhalation/trauma, with eight more injured nearby. This missile was reportedly not intercepted, and Israeli officials acknowledged “failure.”
    • Tel Aviv Strike Claim: Iran’s IRGC claimed to have struck an Israeli military intelligence facility in Tel Aviv’s Ramat Gan district with a new wave of long-range missiles. The IDF has not yet formally responded to this specific claim.
    • New Tactics: Iran has reportedly used a missile armed with a cluster munitions warhead for the first time in the current conflict. This warhead scattered submunitions across central Israel, hitting a home in Azor, marking a dangerous escalation in tactics.
    • Continuing Escalation: Iran’s IRGC released new footage showing missile attacks targeting Israeli military sites, vowing a “missile hurricane.” The conflict is now in its seventh day with no signs of slowing.
    • Iranian Warnings: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei issued a stern warning to the United States against intervening.
  • Russia - Ukraine:
    • Continuing Conflict: Russia continues its grinding military campaign. Putin stated Russia wants to end the Ukraine conflict “ASAP.”
    • Ukrainian Attacks: Ukraine’s drone attacks are striking deeper into Russia, indicating Russia’s vast size might be becoming a liability. Ukraine’s daring drone assaults are forcing Russia to shelter and relocate aircraft.
    • Geopolitical Analysis: Analysts note similarities between the Ukrainian drone attack on Russia and Israeli attacks on Iran, both occurring during stalled US negotiations and relying on covert intelligence operations to hit strategic assets and sow vulnerability.
    • No Retreat from Putin: Putin reportedly has no incentive to negotiate currently, as his army is making grueling progress on the battlefield.
  • China - Taiwan:
    • Increased Military Activity: Taiwan’s Ministry of Defence detected 50 Chinese military aircraft and six naval vessels operating near Taiwan. This follows the passage of a British naval vessel through the Taiwan Strait and is seen as an escalation.
    • Taiwanese Alert: Taiwan President Lai Ching-te ordered defense and security units to step up monitoring and intelligence efforts, noting that China’s military pressure in the First and Second Island Chains has not abated due to the Middle East conflict. He highlighted simultaneous operations of Chinese aircraft carriers Shandong and Liaoning.
    • Geopolitical Context: Taiwan’s fate is “inevitably tied” to a conflict over Taiwan, with US forces in Korea potentially mobilizing to defend Taiwan, which could lead to Chinese attacks on US bases in Korea.
  • North Korea:
    • Military Exercise: North Korea fired approximately 10 artillery shells from its multiple rocket launcher system towards the Yellow Sea, a day after South Korea conducted joint air drills with the United States and Japan. This system can target Seoul.
    • Condemnation of Israel: North Korea slammed Israel’s attack on Iran as a “hideous act.”
    • Axis Overstatement: A SIPRI 2025 yearbook report suggests that concerns about a ‘North Korean axis with China, Russia, and Iran are overstated,’ even considering North Korea’s military support for Russia. SIPRI estimates North Korea possesses approximately 50 assembled nuclear warheads.
    • Taiwan Conflict Ramifications: An essay suggests a conflict in Taiwan would inevitably have ramifications for Korea, requiring South Korea to take charge of its own defense against North Korea if US forces mobilize for Taiwan.

Cross-Regional Connections:

Despite their unique origins, the conflicts in Iran-Israel, Russia-Ukraine, China-Taiwan, and Korea exhibit striking linkages and parallel behaviors. Adversarial states in these flashpoints are demonstrably learning from each other, employing similar innovative, asymmetric tactics like deep strikes to hit larger foes and sow vulnerability. Beyond tactical mirroring, explicit strategic alignments are evident: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are increasingly coordinating to counter U.S. influence. This includes Russia’s efforts to mediate in the Middle East, and unified diplomatic and information operations from Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang condemning U.S. allies and framing Western actions as aggressive across all theaters.

Doctrinally, these four adversaries share a military posture emphasizing missiles for deterrence and coercion, believing saturation tactics can overwhelm advanced defenses. A convergent trend is their broad use of unmanned systems and standoff weapons, pioneering new tactics. Fundamentally, these flashpoints are strategically interlinked; actions in one arena trigger ripple effects, creating a precarious balance where changes in pressure on one front can prompt shifts in behavior elsewhere, thus tying these conflicts into a single, grand strategic chessboard, and heightening overall risk.

Probabilistic Forecasts (24–72 Hours)

In the near term (next 24–72 hours), each theater faces distinct imminent scenarios. We provide likelihood assessments using qualitative probability (low/moderate/high/very high) alongside an approximate confidence level:

  • Iran–Israel:
    • Very high likelihood (~90% confidence) of continued intense missile and drone exchanges. Iran’s IRGC is expected to sustain its retaliatory “missile hurricane” barrage against Israeli cities and infrastructure, having already launched hundreds of missiles and drones in the past week. Further cluster-munition warhead attacks are possible, given Iran’s apparent willingness to broaden blast radii despite the risk to civilians.
    • High probability (~80%) that Israel will carry out additional airstrikes deep into Iranian territory against high-value targets (missile sites, nuclear facilities), as it seeks to cripple Iran’s capabilities while it has international backing.
    • There is a moderate chance (~40%) that the conflict could expand regionally in the next 72 hours – for instance, Israeli strikes might provoke Iran’s proxies (e.g. Hezbollah or militias in Syria/Iraq) to open secondary fronts, though a full regional war in that timeframe remains low likelihood (~20%) as all sides calibrate the risk.
    • Any U.S. intervention in the next 3 days is low likelihood (~10%), constrained by Tehran’s warnings and Washington’s desire to avoid immediate entanglement; instead the U.S. will likely focus on bolstering Israel’s defenses (e.g. air defenses, intelligence sharing) without direct combat engagement (confidence ~90%).
    • Overall, the near-term outlook is sustained high-intensity conflict, with little prospect of a ceasefire (nearly 0% chance in 72 hours) given maximalist rhetoric on both sides.
  • Russia–Ukraine:
    • High likelihood (~70% confidence) that Russia will continue its slow but steady offensive operations on the ground, pressing incremental gains especially in eastern Ukraine. In the next 72 hours, expect ongoing Russian artillery barrages and limited assaults, but no sudden breakthrough.
    • Concurrently, Ukraine is highly likely (~80%) to continue asymmetric strikes aimed at Russia’s strategic depth. Recent patterns – such as drone attacks on airbases or supply depots deep inside Russia – will persist or increase, inspired in part by the success of covert strikes (some analysts compare Ukraine’s deep-strike tactics to Israel’s proactive strikes on Iran’s soil).
    • We assign a moderate probability (~50%) that Ukraine will launch a notable drone or sabotage operation inside Russia in the next few days, aiming to disrupt Moscow’s logistics or signal that no area is safe.
    • Politically, despite Putin’s public remarks expressing a desire to end the war “as soon as possible,” there is very low likelihood (~10%) of any meaningful compromise emerging imminently. Western observers note Putin shows no sign of real concession – recent peace talk overtures appear to be stalling tactics – so the war will grind on.
    • The chance of a dramatic escalation (for example, Russia openly bringing in Belarus or employing a tactical nuclear weapon in 72 hours) remains extremely low (<5%), as the Kremlin likely assesses that its current steady approach is sufficient and overt escalation carries unpredictable risk.
    • Thus, expect continued attritional fighting and possibly more headline-grabbing Ukrainian strikes, but no fundamental shift in the front lines in the immediate term.
  • China–Taiwan:
    • Very high likelihood (~90% confidence) of continued elevated PLA military activity around Taiwan over the next 24–72 hours. Taiwan’s defense ministry already reported 50 Chinese military aircraft and 6 naval vessels operating around the island in just the past day, including fighters crossing the Taiwan Strait median line. This tempo is likely to persist or even rise.
    • With two Chinese carriers (Liaoning and Shandong) reportedly conducting dual-carrier operations in the region, the PLA may undertake joint air-sea exercises as a show of force – we assess a high probability (~75%) of additional carrier aviation drills or missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan in the next few days.
    • The recent transit of a British Royal Navy vessel (HMS Spey) through the Taiwan Strait on June 18 has drawn Beijing’s ire, so China may respond with extra assertiveness (e.g. shadowing foreign ships, declaring exclusion zones) – moderate likelihood (~50%) of a specific maneuver intended to warn the UK/US and others against “interference.”
    • Taiwan’s leadership (President William Lai) has called for enhanced vigilance, and Taiwan’s military is on high alert; high probability (~80%) that Taipei will publicize any large Chinese incursion and may scramble jets or deploy naval assets to monitor PLA movements, while being careful to avoid incidents.
    • We judge an extremely low likelihood (~5%) of a direct Chinese attack or blockade of Taiwan in the immediate 72-hour window – such a drastic step would likely be preceded by more overt mobilization and geopolitical signals than observed so far. However, the risk of an accident or miscalculation is elevated: intercepts of aircraft or close encounters at sea carry a moderate probability (~30%) of a near-miss incident.
    • Overall confidence is high that tensions will remain elevated but below the threshold of war, as Beijing continues its campaign of military posturing and psychological pressure on Taipei.
  • North Korea:
    • High likelihood (~85% confidence) that North Korea will continue provocative military demonstrations in the short term, especially in reaction to recent U.S.-South Korea-Japan activities. Within the last 48 hours, Pyongyang fired approximately 10 artillery/rocket shells into the Yellow Sea shortly after a trilateral air drill by the U.S., ROK, and Japan.
    • We anticipate similar tit-for-tat responses will persist: for instance, moderate probability (~60%) that North Korea may conduct a short-range ballistic missile launch or additional multiple-rocket volley in the next 1–3 days to protest ongoing allied exercises or to draw attention.
    • Kim Jong Un’s regime also issued harsh statements condemning Israel’s actions in Iran, but these are likely propaganda; low likelihood (~15%) that North Korea will do more than rhetorical support for Iran (e.g. no indication of imminent material involvement in that conflict in this timeframe).
    • The regime may attempt a cyber provocation or political announcement to stay in the news cycle, although a nuclear test or ICBM test in 72 hours is very low probability (~5%) – such a major test would likely wait for a more calculated timing.
    • Meanwhile, the U.S. and South Korea are watching for any North Korean exploitation of the U.S.’s diverted focus; moderate chance (~40%) Pyongyang could take advantage of U.S. strategic distraction (with crises elsewhere) to press its own military development (e.g. satellite launch or engine test), but nothing suggesting an immediate crisis.
    • In summary, expect ongoing low-level provocations (artillery, SRBM tests) and aggressive rhetoric from North Korea in the coming days, but not a full-blown confrontation.

“What If?” Scenarios to Monitor

Considering the fragility of the current strategic landscape, several plausible contingencies could trigger cascade effects across regions. We outline a few “what if” scenarios that warrant close monitoring:

  • What if the Israel–Iran war expands to a second front?
    • For example, if Hezbollah in Lebanon opens a front against Israel in solidarity with Iran, Israel would be fighting on multiple fronts. This would greatly escalate regional conflict, likely prompting urgent U.S. resupply or even intervention to back Israel.
    • A widening of the war could draw in other actors (Syria, Iranian militias in Iraq, or U.S. forces in the Gulf if Iran retaliates against them), diverting U.S. military assets to the Middle East and potentially leaving fewer resources for Europe and Asia.
    • A multi-front Middle East war would also spike energy prices and global economic stress, indirectly aiding Russia’s revenues and straining Western cohesion as governments grapple with another major crisis.
  • What if Russia opts for a major escalation in Ukraine (e.g. use of a tactical nuclear weapon or a strike on NATO territory)?
    • Such a gambit, while unlikely, would be a game-changer. A Russian tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine, for instance, would shatter norms and force a heavy international response – possibly drawing the U.S. and NATO into more direct action against Russia.
    • This would immediately consume U.S./NATO attention and resources, putting all other issues on the back burner.
    • China and Iran would carefully watch NATO’s response; depending on it, they might either be deterred from aggressive moves (seeing a forceful U.S. reaction) or conversely exploit NATO’s preoccupation (if the Euro-Atlantic theater becomes all-consuming).
    • In short, a drastic Russian escalation could trigger a chain of events leading to a new kind of Cold War-style standoff or even limited great-power clashes, with global security ramifications far beyond Ukraine.
  • What if China initiates a blockade or forced reunification move against Taiwan?
    • If Beijing, sensing distraction in Washington, were to declare a “no-fly/no-sail zone” around Taiwan or even attempt a sudden military operation, it would ignite the Indo-Pacific’s most dangerous crisis in decades. The U.S. would face immense pressure to respond (perhaps moving carriers and scrambling regional forces to break a blockade).
    • Such a scenario could compel Washington to redeploy troops and assets from other regions – for example, pulling some forces out of Korea or the Middle East to reinforce the Pacific.
    • U.S. allies like Japan and Australia would be drawn in, and concurrently, North Korea might seize the chance to make military moves of its own, calculating that U.S. focus is split.
    • A Taiwan contingency unfolding while the Russia-Ukraine war and Iran-Israel conflict burn would stretch the U.S. to the limit and pose the nightmare of a two-front (or three-front) confrontation with nuclear-armed adversaries.
  • What if North Korea conducts a major provocation (such as a nuclear test or ICBM launch) during the height of these other crises?
    • This would create a cascading security emergency in North Asia. A nuclear test would violate Pyongyang’s moratorium and likely panic the region, prompting emergency U.N. meetings and calls in Seoul and Tokyo for stronger deterrence.
    • The U.S. might have to rush strategic assets (like bombers or carriers) to Korea/Japan as a show of force, interrupting plans to reinforce other theaters.
    • Such a test could also embolden Iran (politically, by showing that nuclear breakout can occur despite global attention elsewhere) or even complicate U.S. diplomacy with China (as Beijing would be under pressure to rein in its ally).
    • Essentially, a North Korean nuclear or ICBM event would add a third simultaneous crisis for the U.S., potentially overwhelming the bandwidth of U.S. decision-makers and forcing extremely difficult choices about prioritization – all while adversaries watch how Washington handles yet another front.

Each of these “what if” scenarios underscores the interlocked nature of today’s flashpoints. A dramatic escalation in one arena can rapidly transmit shockwaves through the others, either by directly demanding U.S. attention and resources or by signaling to remaining adversaries that an opportune moment has arrived. The U.S. and its allies will need agile contingency planning to prevent a chain reaction where one crisis begets another. Monitoring these contingencies closely is critical in the coming days, as the line between a contained regional conflict and a broader conflagration is perilously thin.

Sources: